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COMMENTS
have become the means of creating a large part of the demand that
causes goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. ' 43 The
court then proceeded to point out the unfairness in allowing manufac-
turers to represent by such means that their products possess certain
merits, the lack of which is not easily discovered, and then refusing to
hold them liable on these representations just because there is no privity
of contract.
CONCLUSION
In the light of Toni, Baxter, and similar decisions, where recovery was
permitted on the warranty in an ad, perhaps Cobb v. American Motors-
which launched this entire discussion-would not appear to be a true
innovation on the privity rule. The distinction to be noted, however, is
that in Toni, Baxter, and the like, there was some physical harm to the
plaintiff as the result of the product not being as represented. In the
Cobb case, however, plaintiff's action on the express warranty involved
a purely monetary loss because the car did not give 32 miles per gallon
of gas. It is almost self-evident that the courts would be more readily
inclined to drop the privity requirement in cases of personal injury; with
this in view, it can hardly be doubted that Cobb is the most liberal de-
parture from the privity rule in the express warranty ad cases. There-
fore, decisions of the Toni and Baxter variety have not gone as far as,
but have rather served to augur an adjudication such as made in the
Cobb case.
Will the Supreme Court of Louisiana uphold the Cobb v. American
Motors decision? In the past ultimate consumers attempting to recover
on representations in advertisements have found that the old trail of
precedent leads to the blind alley of privity. It may be that in the future,
however, they will find available a new highway in Cobb v. American
Motors-a highway leading to recovery.
THE PARENTAL DUTY TO SUPPORT
DISABLED ADULT CHILDREN
The family has often been described as the basic unit of our society.
Throughout the history of the law, the courts and legislatures have en-
deavored to set forth the rights and duties of the various members of the
family in relation to each other. One such duty is that of the parent to
support his child. Only recently have the American courts been in
agreement as to the child's right to such support and to its extent.
43 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, 412 (1932).
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THE EARLY LAW
The duty of the parent to support his children has undergone a con-
siderable change in the history of the law. At early common law the
duty of support owing from the parent to the child was thought of solely
as a natural obligation and there was no legal obligation on the part of
the parent to maintain his child.'
The first statutory enactment that cast this burden of support upon
parents was the Poor Law Act2 which in its sixth section provided: "The
father and grandfather and the mother and the grandmother, and the
children of every poor, old, blind, lame, and impotent person, or other
poor person not able to work, being of sufficient ability shall at their
own charges relieve and maintain such poor person." This statute ex-
tended only to natural relatives and not relatives in law, but by a later
amendment, the husband was held to have the duty to maintain his wife's
children by a former marriage.3
Notice must be taken of the fact that the "poor law" does not form a
satisfactory basis for liability on the part of a parent to third persons.
However, the weight of authority in this country is to the contrary and
holds that a third person may recover for necessaries furnished to a
minor child under proper circumstances.4
The early common law rule, that the duty of a parent to support his
children was only a moral obligation, was principally sustained by early
decisions in England and in some of the American states. These cases
held that there was no legal obligation on the part of the parent unless
by force of some statute.5
One of the courts in this country which gave its support to the doctrine
admitted that at first glance this view seemed startling and opposed to
the natural sense of justice, in that it did not provide for punishment for
breach of such duty unless specifically set out in a statute. However, it
was the opinion of the court that the common law considered moral
obligations of this nature as better left in their performance to the im-
pulses of nature.6 As Chancellor Kent observed: "The obligation of
1 Bazeley v. Forder, 3 L.R. Q.B. 559, 37 L.J. Q.B. 237 (1868); For a treatment of the
early law in this area, see: Cairns, Eversley on Domestic Relations, c. 2, 1 3, p. 518, 519
(1937).
2 43 Eliz. c. 2, S 6 (1601).
3 4, 5 Wm. 4, c. 76 (1834).
4 Sisson v. Schultz, 251 Mich. 553, 232 N.W. 253 (1930); Simsin Garment Co. v.
Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 196 N.W. 783 (1924); Van Valkenburgh v. Watson, 13 Johns
(N.Y.) 480, 7 Am.Dec. 395 (1816); 2 Kent Comm. 190 (1867).
5 E.g., Hollingsworth v. Swedenborg, 49 Ind. 378, 19 Am. Rep. 687 (1875); Hunt v.
Thompson, 4 111.179, 36 Am.Dec. 538 (1840).
a Kelley v. Davis, 49 N.H. 187, 6 Am.Rep. 499 (1870).
parental duty is so well secured by the strength of natural affection, that
it seldom requires to be enforced by human laws."'7
This view was subsequently repudiated by the majority of American
courts." The prevailing view, at the present time, is that parents are,
regardless of any statute, under a legal as well as a moral duty to sup-
port, maintain and care for their clildren.9 This obligation is sometimes
spoken of as one under common law and sometimes as a matter of natural
right and justice, and is often accepted as a matter of course without the
assignment of any reason.
The primary and basic reason for the imposition of the duty is the
inability of the infant children to provide for themselves. In Brosius v.
Barker,10 the obligation was based on the helplessness of the child. The
court discussed the fact that the child comes into the world helpless and
incapable of protecting itself. Yet it was noted that in some jurisdictions
the courts hold that the parents who have bestowed life upon these
children have no legal obligation to support or preserve them. In render-
ing a decision in which they recognize the duty of a parent, the court
called attention to the great weight of modern authority which repudiates
the doctrine denying such liability and declares it to be opposed to the
natural sense of justice.
While the courts now generally hold that the parent has a legal duty
to support his children, even in the absence of statute, there is some
conflict as to the extent of such duty. Some courts maintain that the
common law went no further than to impose on the parents the duty of
supporting their minor children, and that they owed no such duty to
their adult children.11 In Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty,12 an action was
brought against a father requiring him to pay for the support of his
insane son who was in a state insane asylum. The Napa court stated in
unequivocal terms that the right to maintain any action against the father
for the support of an adult child, if any such right existed, was purely
a creation of statute.
72 Kent Comm. 189 (1867).
8 Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1902); Osborn v. Weatherford, 27 Ala.App. 258,
170 So. 95 (1936); Butler v. Commission, 132 Va. 609, 110 S.E. 868 (1922); Gulley v.
Gulley, 111 Tex. 233, 231 S.W. 97 (1921); Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission,
294 I. 106, 128 N.E. 289 (1920); Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890).
9 Ibid.
10 154 Mo.App. 657, 136 S.W. 18 (1911).
11 Littleton v. Uttleton, 295 Ky. 720, 175 S.W.2d 502 (1943); Miller v. Miller, 52
CalApp.2d 443, 126 P.2d 357 (1942); Manners v. State, 210 Ind. 648, 5 N.E.2d 300 (1936).
12 134 Cal. 315, 66 Pac. 322 (1901). In this case recovery was had against the father
for the support of his son on the basis of a California statute which provides that insane
children in state hospitals are to be supported by their parents if the parents are of suf-
ficient pecuniary ability. Cal. Stat. (1889) § 8, p. 330.
.247COMMENTS
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
In following this strict view, some American courts hold that the
parent has no duty to the adult child even though he may be incapacitated
and is incapable of supporting himself.13 The court, in Moss v. Moss,
1 4
held: "The duty of a parent to provide support for an adult son who is
incapable of earning a livelihood because of bodily infirmity or by reason
of mental disability is statutory. No legal liability existed at common
law."' 5 In Murrab v. Bailes'0 the Alabama Supreme Court stated: "It is
obvious in order to establish liability against the father for the support
of an adult child who is insane, in the absence of a contract, there must
be some statute which authorizes the establishment of the liability.' ' 7
Many of the American courts now hold that a parent is under a duty
to support an adult incapacitated child, but they differ on the ground
upon which they base this opinion. In some of the states, the liability of
a parent to an adult incapacitated child is based on statutes resembling
the Poor Law Act which place upon relatives the duty to support a
member of the family who cannot support himself and would otherwise
be a public charge.' Illinois has such a statute which provides: "The
parents are severally liable for the support of any child or children under
eighteen years of age or eighteen years or over, whenever such child is
unable to maintain himself and is likely to become a public charge."'19
Even in the absence of statute, there is a definite tendency for the
courts to recognize such an obligation either through a modern socio-
logical interpretation of the common law or on the basis of the hu-
manitarian rule of family relations. 20 Representative of the rationale of
a large number of decisions in which the duty was founded on the so-
called humanitarian rule, is Wells v. Wells.21 The Wells court decided
I8 Beilstein v. Beilstein, 31 Ohio 116, 61 N.E.2d 620 (1945); Moss v. Moss, 163 Wash.
444, 1 P.2d 916 (1931); In re Northcutt, 81 Ore. 646, 148 Pac. 1133 (1915); Napa State
Hospital v. Flaherty, 134 Cal. 315, 66 Pac. 322 (1901).
14 163 Wash. 444, 1 P.2d 916 (1931).
15 Ibid., at 918. Washington had such a statute stating that "a poor person" shall be
supported by the father, grandfather, mother, grandmother, children, grandchildren,
brothers or sisters of such poor person if they or either of them be of sufficient ability.
Rem. Comp. Stat. (1930) 59982.
16 255 Ala. 178, 50 So.2d 735 (1951).
17 Ibid., at 180.
18 Vt. Stat. (1959) c.33, §931.2; Mass. Laws (1957) c. 117, S6; Neb. Rev. State. c.68,
§101 (Supp., 1957); Del. Code t.13, §501 (1953); Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) c.401,
S2, 5; Ohio Stat. L.O.L. (1853) §7054.
19111. Rev. Stat. (1959) c.23, S112.
20 Davis v. Davis, 246 Iowa 262, 67 N.W.2d 566 (1954); In re Glass' Estate, 175 Kan.
246, 262 P.2d 934 (1953); Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wash.2d 390, 229 P.2d 333
(1951); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947).
21227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947).
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that ordinarily the law presumes that when a child reaches the age of
twenty-one he will be capable of maintaining himself. However, where
this presumption is rebutted by the fact of mental or physical incapacity,
the obligation of the father continues. The court based its decision en-
tirely upon the public policy of the state and the "dictates of humanity.
22
Other courts recognize the obligation of support as being in the nature
of a common law obligation. 23 Such a view was expressed by the court
in Van Tinker v. Van Tinker,24 where the court said: "These authorities,
and many others which might be cited, pronounce the rule to be that
the legal duty of a parent to support his normal children ceases at the
age of majority, but if any of them are so defective as to be incapable of
self-support he owes a continuing obligation of support as long as it is
necessary. This obligation is one created by the common law."25
The courts that find this duty by an extension of the common law
rule seem to do so by rationalizing that the adult incapacitated "child"
is just as helpless as an infant and should, therefore, be included under
the common law rule which would entitle him to support by his parents.
Such a view was expressed by the court in Crain v. Mallone:2
0
The duty and obligation of a parent to care for his offspring does not neces-
sarily terminate when the child arrives at age or becomes an adult; nor is it
limited to infants and children of tender years. An adult child may from
accident or disease be as helpless and incapable of making his support as an
infant, and we see no difference in principle between the duty imposed upon
the parent to support the infant and the obligation to care for the adult, who
is equally, if not more, dependent upon the parent. In either case the natural
as well as the legal obligation is the same, if the parent is financially able to
furnish the necessary assistance.27
Some jurisdictions, in imposing liability on a parent for an incapacitated
adult child, make a qualification that the child for whom support is
sought after majority, must have been incapacitated at the time of reach-
ing majority.28 Other courts require that the child have remained at the
parent's home and, in addition, require that the child have remained as
22 Ibid., at 35.
23 In re Glass' Estate, 175 Kan. 246, 262 P.2d 934 (1953); Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J.
Super. 26, 69 A.2d 752 (1949); Zakrocki v. Zakrocki, 115 Ind.App. 565, 60 N.E.2d 745
(1945); Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 Atl.549 (1930); Freestate v. Freestate,
244 Ill.App. 166 (1927).
24 38 Wash.2d 390, 229 P.2d 333 (1951).
25 Ibid., at 334.
26 130 Ky. 125, 113 S.W. 67 (1908).
27 Ibid., at 68.
2 8 Crain v. Mallone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S.W. 67 (1908); Mt. Pleasant v. Wilcox, 2 Pa.
Dist. 628 (1893).
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a member of the family of the parent on whom the obligation is sought
to be imposed. 29 These qualifications are not a precedent to statutory
liabilities and are not required in the greatest number of cases decided
on general principles.
CONCLUSION
In view of the many well settled decisions on the subject and the
various statutes in effect in many states, it is clear that in the vast.majority
of jurisdictions the tendency is to impose upon the parent the duty to
support an adult incapacitated child who cannot maintain himself. Such
an expansion of liability is based either upon a construction of statutory
law or a judicial expansion of common law.
29Breuer v. Dowden, 207 Ky. 12, 268 S.W. 541 (1925); Blachley v. Laba, 63 Iowa
22, 18 N.W. 658 (1884).
THE REQUIREMENT OF SCIENTER
IN OBSCENITY STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
To the practitioner and law student, the state of mind of the accused
at the time the activity in question occurred is a vital factor in determin-
ing criminal liability. In most instances determining the necessity, nature
and existence of the mens rea is a perplexing problem in research, investi-
gation and mental gymnastics. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate
the mental element in statutes and ordinances pertaining to First Amend-
ment rights; specifically, statutes and ordinances dealing with the control
of distribution of obscene material.
Blackstone spoke of "vicious will" and a consequent unlawful act as
constituting a crime.' The United States Supreme Court has said: "The
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence."'2 Black's Law Dictionary
succinctly defines mens rea as a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful pur-
pose; a criminal intent.8 Judge Learned Hand defined mens rea in United
States v. Crimmins.4
Ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the existence
of all those facts which make his conduct criminal. That awareness is all that
is meant by the mens rea, the 'criminal intent,' necessary to guilt, as distinct
from the additional specific intent required in certain instances ... and even
this general intent is not always necessary.5
I Blackstone's Commentaries, Bk. 4, p. 294 (1889).
2 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
3 Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (3rd ed., 1933).
4 123 F.2d 271 (C.C.A. 2d, 1941). 5 Ibid., at 272.
